By Leonnel Mhuka
Today we’re examining Constitutional Amendment Bill Number 3, specifically Clauses 4, 9 and 10, which seek to extend the terms of office of the President, Members of Parliament and local councillors.
The central question is simple: Can elected officials extend their own terms of office without a referendum?
According to the Constitution, the answer is no.
Let’s begin with Clause 4 of CAB 3. The clause seeks to amend Section 95 of the Constitution by increasing the President’s term of office from five years to seven years. However, the clause contains a significant phrase. It states that, notwithstanding Section 328(7), the amendment shall apply to the continuation in office of the President.
That phrase is important because it effectively acknowledges that Section 328(7) applies to this amendment.
Section 328(7) of the Constitution states that any amendment to a term limit provision which extends the length of time a person may hold public office cannot benefit a person who already held that office before the amendment came into effect.
The next question therefore becomes: Is Section 95 a term limit provision?
The Constitution answers that question itself.
Section 328 defines a term limit provision as any constitutional provision that limits the length of time a person may hold public office.
Section 95 currently provides that the President serves a five-year term. If that five-year term is replaced with a seven-year term, the length of time the President may hold office is clearly extended.
As a result, Section 95 falls squarely within the definition of a term limit provision, meaning that Section 328(7) applies.
The Constitutional Court has already confirmed this interpretation.
In the Max Mupungu case, the Constitutional Court specifically identified Section 95 as a term limit provision and stated that any amendment extending the length of time a person may hold office falls within the scope of Section 328(7).
The Court further held that such an amendment cannot benefit an incumbent office holder.
That brings us to another critical constitutional safeguard.
The drafters of the Constitution anticipated that future governments might attempt to amend these protections. For that reason, Section 328(9) provides that amendments to Section 328 itself must follow the special procedures reserved for entrenched constitutional provisions.
Those procedures include a referendum.
Section 328 therefore creates a double layer of protection. First, incumbents cannot benefit from extensions of their terms. Second, if Parliament wishes to remove that protection, it must obtain approval from the people of Zimbabwe through a referendum.
This is where the wording of CAB 3 becomes significant.
By stating that the amendment shall apply “notwithstanding Section 328(7),” the bill attempts to set aside a constitutional restriction that was deliberately designed to prevent incumbents from extending their own stay in office.
The Constitution says incumbents may not benefit. CAB 3 says they will benefit despite that restriction.
The Constitution says the people must decide certain constitutional questions through a referendum. CAB 3 seeks to proceed without one.
The issue therefore is not political. It is constitutional.
The Constitution established a five-year mandate for the President, Members of Parliament and councillors. That mandate expires in 2028. No election campaign was fought on the promise of extending those terms, and no mandate was given by the electorate for elected officials to lengthen their own time in office.
The Constitution already provides the mechanism for changing entrenched provisions: a referendum.
Ultimately, this debate is about whether constitutional limits matter. If elected officials can extend their own terms without returning to the people, then constitutional term limits become meaningless.
The Constitution is clear. Section 95 is a term limit provision. Section 328(7) prevents incumbents from benefiting from an extension of their terms. Section 328(9) requires a referendum to alter those protections.
The question now is whether those constitutional safeguards will be respected.
