By Leonnel Mhuka
In recent days, social media has been awash with debate over the reshuffle of ZANU PF’s Politburo, the party’s top decision-making body. The most notable change was the demotion of Obert Mpofu from Secretary General to Secretary for ICT, a move many analysts argue was designed to weaken him due to his close ties with General Constantino Chiwenga. This has reignited speculation about factional battles within ZANU PF, particularly between Mnangagwa and Chiwenga. Since 2018, the public has been told repeatedly that the two are locked in a bitter struggle over succession, control of natural resources and influence in the security sector. But how true is this narrative?
The Myth of ZANU PF Infighting
While the perception of division inside ZANU PF has persisted for years, it has not produced any meaningful change in governance. In fact, things have only gotten worse, with citizens enduring deepening poverty, collapsing basic services, and an ever-worsening economic crisis. Yet people continue to cling to the false hope that factional wars will eventually weaken the party and create space for democratic renewal. While the perception of division inside ZANU PF has persisted for years, it has not produced any meaningful change in governance. Citizens have been left clinging to the false hope that factional wars would eventually weaken the regime, creating space for democratic renewal. Yet, despite frequent reshuffles and public rumors, ZANU PF has only emerged stronger with an even tighter grip on power, while ordinary Zimbabweans continue to face deepening poverty, collapsing public services and an unrelenting economic crisis.
Even if Chiwenga were to replace Mnangagwa tomorrow, there is little reason to expect better leadership. Like Mnangagwa, Chiwenga is surrounded by elites whose main interest is consolidating power and looting resources. His leading role in Operation Restore Legacy in 2017, which ousted Robert Mugabe under the pretense of removing “criminals” around him, is proof enough. That operation was not about restoring legacy, but about reinforcing ZANU PF’s grip on power and preserving access to state resources.
Capture of Opposition, Parliament and Judiciary
The post-Mugabe era has been defined not by reform, but by systematic state capture. ZANU PF has neutralized opposition politics and entrenched its dominance across all key institutions.
Opposition Weakened: Through the co-opting of Douglas Mwonzora and the manipulation of judiciary and parliamentary processes, ZANU PF successfully fractured the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). For the first time, state institutions, including the military, were openly used to tilt the balance within the opposition.
Judiciary Compromised: Parliament controversially, with the support from both ZANU PF and Mwonzora’s MDC, extended Chief Justice Luke Malaba’s term beyond retirement age and passed constitutional amendments that expanded presidential control over the judiciary. This has effectively ensured that no ZANU PF member can be prosecuted independently of the party’s interests.
Parliament Neutralized: Speaker of Parliament Jacob Mudenda, himself a senior ZANU PF figure, sided with an impostor faction of the Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC), enabling ZANU PF to gain a two-thirds parliamentary majority it had failed to secure at the ballot box.
The so-called “Second Republic” has therefore succeeded not in reforming the state, but in capturing the opposition, the judiciary, and parliament itself.
Preparing for 2028 and Beyond
Mudenda’s appointment as ZANU PF Secretary General confirms this consolidation. Meanwhile, a series of constitutional amendment bills already before parliament suggest preparations are underway to extend Mnangagwa’s presidency beyond 2028.
This raises urgent questions: Can opposition MPs realistically block such moves when the ruling party has already secured a two-thirds majority? Can citizens trust parliament to safeguard democracy when its structures are so deeply compromised?
The Wake-Up Call
The reality is that relying solely on parliament or on opposition MPs will not stop authoritarian drift. Zimbabwean citizens must recognize that constitutionalism and democratic reform will not come from ZANU PF’s internal battles. If anything, the recent Politburo reshuffle signals that the party is preparing for an even stronger grip on power, both against rivals within its ranks and against external challenges. The call for electoral reforms and genuine democratic space must therefore grow louder. The lesson from the past seven years is clear that change will not come from ZANU PF’s factional politics, but from active and sustained citizen engagement.
